A

## REVIEW

OFTHE

## STATE

OFTHE

## BRITISH NATION.

Cuelday, August 5. 1707.

Am now come to examine where, and in what part of the World, any thing can be likely to happen, which may be possible to make up an equivalent to the French for the loss of Thoulon.

And I'll divide my Enquiry, into the probable and improbable, into the Negative and the Politives, to Illustrate one another and make up the Variety of the learth the more agreeable.

A Ramellies, a Victory like Ramellies over the Confederate Army in Flanders, with the Recovery of the open Cities in Flanders, and an Eruption into Holland, which fuch a thing would perhaps be attended with; I confess, this would go far to make the French amends; but of this I believe we may with Satisfaction say, even the French themselves will own, there is not so much as a Probability—And therefore I will no more amuse

the Reader with that; I wish the French Interest no fairer a Prospect any where than they have there,

Taking Caralonia, and beating King Charles out of Barcelona; nay, the they should take him Prisoner there, and compleatly destroy all his Interest—The I confess this would be a very great blow to our Affairs, yet it would by no means make up the Conquest of Thoulon, and the subsequent Advantages of it, which are too many to talk of, till we see the Prospect of it in a farther forwardness.

I confess, the Probability of this Blow is Catalonia, does not seem so remote as I could wish it to be, and the Distance; Backwardness, and Incapacity of his Friends to succour King Charles, makes him in my Opinion in much more Danger now than he was before, when Besseg'd in Barcelona; for

if the French and Spanish Armies set down before that City again, they will perhaps make much quicker Work with it than they did before; and having a ftronger Army, the Catalans will be sooner reduc'd, and perhaps effectually crush'd, so as to render him no help; his Horse would more effectually scour the Country, and the Siege not depend upon a Fleet but an Army-- The Loss the French receiv'd there appear'd plainly from this Defect, that they being not firong enough to open the Paffages of the Mountains, and keep in Awe the Catalans, depended upon their Fleet to carry on the Siege, which Fleet not daring to look the Confederates in the Face was oblig'd to leave them, and then they had nothing to do but provide for their own Safety as well as they could; and on this Account I have often noted, That had the French had but a Body of 12 or 14000 Men, to have kept open the Paffages of the Mountains, Supply'd them with Provitions, restrain'd the Catalans, and ftrengthned their Hands, they had certainly garried the Town, notwithflanding the Succours brought by the Fleet, which had the French been able to have kept the Field, could have done nothing; and the Fleet could do no more than look on and fee the Town loft.

I must own therefore, I do not look on the beating King Charles out of Catalonia, as Matters now stand, to be at all Impracticable, and if the Earl of Galloway should receive another Affront, as by the great Superiority of the Duke of Berwick's Army, is not at all improbable; I shall expect every Post, to hear of the Spanish and French Troops being under the Walls of Barcelona.

But after all, this whole Conquest would by no means be an Equivalent to the Loss of Thoulon, because I cannot imagine, if that were brought to pass, but the Imperial Arms would soon enter Spain by Land by the way of Languedos; and should the Victorious Prince EUGENE come that length, and Spain be reserved for him to Conquer; I cannot but expect he will make thorter Work of it, than most People may imagine.

But after all, and not to build all upon Successes and Conquests of Kingdoms, I must own, there are three things now on the Stage,

whose probability to me does not seem so remote, which if they should fall out, tho' Prince Eugene had all the Success at Thoulon his Heart could expect, would unravel all his Conquests, and be a compleat equivalent to the Loss of Thoulon; nay, though it were follow'd with the Possession of all Provence, Dauphine, and Languedoc.

1. If the Spaniards, and I wonder they do not, would but add 10000 French Troops to the Armies of the Marquis de Baya, and the Duke D'offuna; and now in the weakness of his Affairs, and the remoteness of Succour, march immediately to the Gates of Lisbon-In which Case they shall perhaps no more content themselves with bringing the King of Portugal to accept a Neutrality, but actually disposes him, and seize upon his Kingdom-I cannot but fay, I believe 20000 Men at this time, are more than fufficient to do this Work, and what the Consequence of such an Attempt would be, and how far it would go to make up the Leffes fuffer'd at the taking of Thoulon, is easy to guess- The Wealth, the Shipping, the Arms, the Magazines of that Kingdom, the Spoils of the Merchants, the Wealth of the Brazils; 'tis a Thought too big to put into Numbers, and yet confidering the eafiness of it, and the fair opportunity the French have for it; I cannot but believe we shall too foon find them looking that way.

I believe no Man will condemn me for faying, that the whole Kingdom of Portugal as now circumftanc'd, for they are cut off from their own Troops, which were with the Lord Galloway, and near 4000 Portuguese Horse are there with him; I say, the whole Power of Portugal is not at this time able to keep the Field, against an Army of 15000 Foot, and 3000 Horse and Dragoons of French Troops, or French and Spaniar As under French Discipline.

And here let me put the World in Mind of one thing, which if this War should last much longer, may, far ought I know, be learnt by Experience, and may make the kecovery of Spain not difficult only, but impossible.

The Spiniards are a brave Nation as any in the World, and tho' by the Errors of their Government, their Men are brought

to be now of no Value in the Field ; yet I need not go far back to tell you, when the Spanish Infantry were the best Foot Soldiers in the World -The Histories of the Low Country War, the Relief of the Cities of Paris and Roan in three or four Sieges, are undentable Proofs of this; and the Great King Henry IV. of France did them Juffice in that Affair, when under the Great Duke of Parma they reliev'd Paris, and retreated in his very Face without Fighting; and he was unable to force them to Fight, but upon fuch Advantage, as would have been his Destruction; upon which, storming at his own Difafters, he turn'd to some of his Great Officers, and faid, If I had that Infantry join'd to my Cavalry, I'd make War against the whole World.

It any Man ask me, what brought the Spiniards down to what they are now, I'll tell him in few Words, Poverty and neglect of Discipline: the Men are the same, their Bloods as warm, their Hearts as Great; but what can Soldiers, naked and starv'd, untrain'd, untaught, and which is worse unpaid; what can they do, and what can be expected from them? this has reduc'd them from the best to the worst Troops in the

World.

In laying this Truth down Historically, any body will find the Argument I am going to form from it—Recover the Spanish Troops from their Misery, their Poverty, and starving Circumstances; let their Officers be encouraged, pay them well, cloath them well, revive their Discipline, keep them in Action, and show them the Enemy, and they will Fight as well as any Nation in the World.

Again, if French Management comes among them, if the Regiments are given to suitable Men, their Management regulated, the Officers encourag'd, enabled to make good Equipages and well furnish'd, if the Soldiers are well paid, well cloath'd, and exactness of Discipline restor'd, as in the French Army is practis'd—I cannot but say, the only Advice is to push the War vigorously before these things can be done, for if the Spaniards recover themselves, all Europe will not be able to beat them.

On the other Hand, Spain is a very large Kingdom, and if joyo'd to Portugal much larger than France, and tho' it is not Populous, yet considering the few Soldiers rais'd in it hitherto, is able on the encrea'e of this War to raise very great Armies; it therefore very much behaves the Confederates to reduce Spain, before, by the Artifice and Dexterity of French Manage. ment, the grows formidable, even in her own Forces- We have feen the French. by the extraordinary Management, Difcipline, and Conduct of Things bring their own Infantry, which in former Ages were very Contemptible to be very serviceable ; how much more shall they restore a Vigorous. Brave, and Valiant Nation by those Arts of War, which all the World must allow they are Mafters of.

But this is by the by; I return to my Notion of Portugal, and I must say, that as the State of the War now lies in Spain, if the French do not push at the Portuguese, they are more deficient in taking Advantages than ever I knew them, and must be blinded by some unaccountable and very unusual Insatuation—And if they do push at them, let any body answer for the Portuguese Detending themselves, they will be the last Nation in the World that I shall expect any thing from, but what is like the Right Wing, at the Battle of Almanza.

I must own therefore, that this would be a melancholy Equivalent for the Success of Prince Eugene at Thoulon; as to the Probability I leave that to the Issue of Time—'Tis according to the dispatch of either side, much of the Success will defined upon the priority of the Execution and that no body can answer for.

## ADVERTISEMENTS.

SOME excellent strengthning Pills, which give certain Help in all Pains or Weakness of the Back, (either in Men or Women) occasion'd by a Strain, a Wrench, or any other Cause; being a sure Remedy (under God) in such Cases for Cura Recommend